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THE DESTRUCTION OF CHURCHES AND MOSQUES IN
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: SEEKING A RIGHTS-BASED
APPROACH TO THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS
CULTURAL PROPERTY
Gregory M. Moset
The Persians encamped upon the hill over against the
Acropolis, which is called the Areopagus by the Athenians, and
began the siege of the place.... As soon as the Athenians saw them
upon the summit, some threw themselves headlong from the wall, and
so peished, while others fled for refuge to the inner part of the temple.
The Persians rushed to the gates and opened them, after which they
massacred the suppliants. When all were slain, they plundered the
temple and fired every part of the citadel.
- Herodotus, Book VIII (52-3) (480 B.C.)
In Novo Selo, a village near Zvomik, Serb troops rounded
up 150 women, children, and old people, and forced them at gunpoint
into the local mosque. In front of the captives, they challenged the
local community leader, Imam Memic Suljo, to desecrate the mosque
.... They told him to make the sign of the cross, eat pork and finally
to have sexual intercourse with a teenage girl.... Suljo refused all
these demands and was beaten and cut with knives. His fate is
unknown.
- Asic Akim
Zvomik police commander' (A.D. 1992)
t Harvard College, A.B., Magna Cum Laude, 1992; Duke University School of Law,
J.D., 1996.
' Roy Gutman, Unholy War; Serbs Target Culture, Heritage of Bosnia's Muslims,
NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk Edition), Sept. 2, 1992, at 3.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The savage conflict taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina has
generated an enormous volume of commentary. While the war can be
seen as an unfavorable inauguration of post Cold War era ethnic strife, it
seems more productive to view the conflict as a crucible for facing
similar problems in the future. The West may have failed the former
Yugoslavia, as some commentators have suggested, but unless we are
prepared to endure future failures, we must learn the lessons that this
tragedy can provide.
Cultural property in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been destroyed on
a staggering scale during the recent conflict. In particular, due to the
ethnic overtones of the conflict and the inescapable links between
ethnicity and religion in the Balkans, religious buildings have been
consistently targeted since the beginning of the war. As the above
quotations demonstrate, the problem is neither new nor unique.
However, the existence of international legal instruments intended to
address the destruction of cultural property is quite recent. While a
number of commentators have pointed out the failure of these
instruments to protect cultural property, none have remarked on the fact
that a large percentage of the churches and mosques destroyed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina would receive no more protection under the
relevant international law concerning cultural property than any other
civilian building. Their special protected status as cultural property
depends upon their value to the world community as cultural
monuments. There is no special protection envisaged under the law of
protection of cultural property during armed conflict for local religious
buildings and the crucial role they play in community life.
Part II(A) of this paper will explain the history and development
of the legal protection of cultural property during armed conflict, and
Part II(B) will review the norms which are applicable to the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Part III will explore current theoretical
justifications for the protection of cultural property. Part IV will focus
upon the situation on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Part IV(A)
will provide an overview of the destruction of religious property in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Part IV(B) will examine a case study in order
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to illuminate a typical pattern of destruction. Part IV(C) will discuss the
phenomenon of "ethnic cleansing" and its relation to the destruction of
cultural property. Finally, Part V will suggest a new theoretical
approach to the destruction of religious property. Part V(A) outlines
current international law that specifically addresses the right to practice
one's religion, and Part V(B) discusses this right as a basis for protecting
churches and mosques which normally would not be provided special
protection by cultural property treaty provisions.
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
DURING ARMED CONFLICT
A. The Development of International Law Related to the Destruction of
Cultural Property During Armed Conflict.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 represent the first
genuine binding codifications of international law as well as the first
substantial international protection of cultural property. A number of
articles in the Hague Conventions address the issue of destruction of
property generally and of cultural property specifically. The Annex to
Hague Convention IV (1907) prohibits unnecessary destruction of
property in Article 23 (g), and more specifically protects cultural
property ("buildings dedicated to religion, art, science ...historic
monuments... provided they are not being used at the time for military
purposes") in Article 27.2 Finally, Article 5 of Hague Convention IX
provides that "[i]n bombardments by naval forces all the necessary
measures must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible
sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, purposes, historical
monuments .... ,, It is significant that the language of these provisions
is compulsory. There remains, however, the qualification of military
necessity, so that cultural property need only be spared insofar as military
2 DEP'TOFDEFENsE, CoN~o OF rE PERSIAN GuLF WAR: FinAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
0-9 [-einafter FINAL REPORT].
3 SHARON A. WILLIAMs, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECITON OF MOVABLE
CLmuRAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIW STuDY 18 (1978).
1996]
183 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERAMTIONAL LAW [Vol. 3
objectives allow it.
While this level of protection may seem scant (the entire subject
merits only three articles), these rules nevertheless remain in force today
and played an important role in protecting Iraqi cultural property during
the Gulf War.4 After the Second World War, however, it became clear
that the standards formulated in these conventions needed to be
reinforced in a new convention that would address the treatment of
cultural property during armed conflict. The resulting 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict has been ratified by seventy-five countries, including the
former Yugoslavia.5 The 1954 Hague Convention expands upon the
norms of the 1907 Hague Conventions, but also adds several new
features to the law of cultural property. Article I of the Convention
defines cultural property as "movable or immovable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people" and offers an
illustrative but non-exclusive list of examples.6 While the reference to
monuments "of great importance" brings up a number of obvious
difficulties, this definition is nevertheless more detailed than any
previously offered. The Convention requires that parties prepare during
time of peace to safeguard cultural property in the event of an armed
conflict.7  Significantly, most of the Convention applies to
non-international as well as international conflicts, and thus avoids many
of the problems inherent in applying the Geneva Conventions.8 It also
establishes a universal sign, a blue and white shield, to indicate cultural
property.' Furthermore, the Convention creates a register on which
monuments of particular importance that qualify for special protection
can be listed. 0 The 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 0-9.
5 David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Its Emergence
into Customary International Law, I 1 B. U. INT'L L.J. 349,352 (1993).
6 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, art. 1,249 U.N.T.S. 240,242 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
7Id
8 Id. at 256.
9 Id. at 252, 254.
10 Id. at 248.
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add several important provisions relating to the protection of cultural
property." Article 52 of Protocol I sets out a general scheme of
protection for civilian objects. Paragraph 1 forbids targeting civilian
objects for the purpose of attack or reprisal. Paragraph 2 defines civilian
versus military objects, making any object which makes an effective
contribution to military objectives a military object. Paragraph 3 notes
that when doubt exists as to whether an object is being used for military
purposes or is strictly civilian in nature, it shall be presumed to be a
civilian object.
Article 53 directly addresses cultural property, and provides:
[W]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other
relevant international instruments, it is prohibited: (a) to
commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (b)
to use such objects in support of the military effort; (c)
to make such objects the objects of reprisals.'
These provisions are basic, reflecting the norms of the 1907 Hague
Convention and the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, and are
considered by some to have attained the status of customary
international law." There is, however, one very significant addition to
the protection of cultural property which appears in both protocols is
entirely absent from the 1954 Hague Convention and seems to represent
" ProtocolAddifional to the Geneva Civilian Convention, andRelating to the Protection
of Victims oflnternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol I) ,[ 1977] 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 95,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]; ProtocolAdditional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), [1977] 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 135,
reprinted in 16 IL.M. 1442 [hereinafterProtocolll].
2 ProtocolI, supra note 11, art. 53, 16 I.L.M. at 1414.
" Meyer, supra note 5, at 362.
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some evolution in the law regarding religious cultural property.
Paragraph (a) of Article 53 forbids acts of hostility directed at properties
which constitute the "cultural or spiritual heritage" of peoples. The
significance of this addition will be discussed below, but it should be
noted here that it arguably extends protection to a number of churches
and mosques which would not be covered by previous law on the
protection of cultural property during armed conflict. 4
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, covering situations of
non-international armed conflict, also contains a rather limited provision
on the protection of cultural property. Article 16 merely states that it is
prohibited to "commit any acts of hostility directed against historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the
military effort." 15 While the provisions of the two Protocols mostly fall
short of the protection offered by the 1954 Convention, they are
important as reassertions of the general principles involved, and as
confirmations of their status as customary international law.
B. Applicable Law on the Protection of Cultural Property During
Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia
The 1907 Hague Conventions have become part of customary
international law, and as such they apply to all combatants in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least to the extent that the conflict there is
considered an international armed conflict. 6 According to the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, successor
i
14 JHi Toman, La Protection des Biens Culturels dans les Conflits Anns Internationaux,
Cadre Juridique et Institutionnel, in STtI.S AD ESSAYS ON IN'ERNATIONAL
HuMIANrmLAANDRED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEA PICIT 559,564-65
(Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
" Protocol 1, supra note 11, art. 16, 16 I.L.M. at 1447.
16 THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTs N INERNAL STRwr: THEIR IERNATIONAL
PROJECroN 4 (1987). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has
detemne that "the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both internal and international
aspects." See Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal (2 October,
1995), The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule," Case No. IT-94- I-AR72, at 43.
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states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina remain bound by the international
treaty obligations of the predecessor state until the successor state
declares that it does not intend to be bound by a particular treaty."
Bosnia-Herzegovina has declared itself to be bound by this treaty, and
has not denounced the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1954 Hague
Convention or the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention.18
Moreover, the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols stipulate
that a country, and thus a successor state, which wishes to denounce
these treaties cannot do so while involved in an armed conflict.1
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has also declared that it
considers itself bound by the treaty obligations of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so that any violations committed by
Yugoslav National Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (JNA)) forces
in Bosnia are covered.' Both Yugoslavia and Croatia have invoked the
1954 Convention and thus implicitly stated that they consider themselves
bound by it. Therefore, any destruction of cultural property committed
by forces under the control of Croatian or Yugoslav authorities would be
a violation under the Convention.21
III. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
The very phrase "cultural property" raises a number of issues,
such as the meaning and importance of culture, the conception of culture
as property, and the ownership of such property. Such issues take on
great significance when attempting to determine what level of protection
monuments should be afforded during armed conflict, and what
measures might be appropriate to ensure their protection.
The difficulty of these questions was vividly demonstrated by one
' Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, opened for signing
Aug. 23, 1978, arts. 34 and 35, UN Doe A/Conf. 80/31 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M.
1488 (1978).
18 Jordan Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499,501 n.8 (Winter 1994).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Meyer, supra note 5, at 384 n. 188.
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critical event at the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia:
the siege of Dubrovnik. Many of the historical and cultural monuments
ofthis medieval walled city were destroyed by artillery fire when the JNA
tried to take the city in its bid to hold together the crumbling federal state
of Yugoslavia. An issue of great importance was what should be
considered a cultural monument in a city whose center consists mostly of
centuries-old buildings. Another issue was how heavily the survival of
these buildings should weigh against the arguably cultural goal of
keeping intact a nation. In this respect it can be difficult to separate
political and cultural goals, since ownership plays an important role in
protecting cultural property. Thus arose the question of whose property
was being destroyed, and if it belonged to federal Yugoslavia, whether
they had the right to destroy it while fighting for the survival of the state.
Moreover, how seriously could the armies involved worry about the fate
of buildings when such important political interests and so many lives
hung in the balance? The public reaction to the siege was illuminating.
There was a great outcry around the world against the destruction of this
historic tourist attraction. The response of others, however, was
indignation at those who, while remaining silent over the human
casualties of the war, were stirred to outcry by the destruction of physical
property. Journalist Amy Schwartz phrased best the question in
everyone's mind: "Is it wrong to weep for buildings?"'
The question was answered well by a Croatian journalist, Ksenija
Drakulic, who wrote in response to the destruction of Mostar Bridge:
Why do we feel more pain looking at the image of the
destroyed bridge than the image of the massacred
people? Perhaps because we see our own mortality in
the collapse of the bridge. We expect people to die; we
count on our own lives to end. The destruction of a
monument to civilization is something else. The bridge,
in all its beauty and grace, was built to outlive us; it was
" AmyE. Schwartz, Is It Wrong to Weep forBuildings?, WAS. PosT, May 10, 1994, at
A17.
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an attempt to grasp eternity. It transcended our
individual destiny.'
In the elegant simplicity of Latin, vita brevis, ars longa, fife is short, art
endures. Yet if cultural monuments are to outlast us all, if they
somehow transcend mortality, there is then a need to examine more
closely the idea of culture as property. Can one truly own something
immortal, with all the property rights that unabridged ownership brings?
In determining who can own cultural property, and by what
theory of ownership, it seems natural to look first to the object's
creation. If the Greeks built the Parthenon, then surely the Parthenon
belongs to the Greeks. This labor theory of property cannot suffice to
answer the question, however, for a number of reasons. If one claims
that the Parthenon belongs to the Greek state, the question of who
owned it during the Ottoman period arises. The Turks arrived in
Anatolia over a thousand years after the Parthenon was built, so they
could not claim ownership by creation. Yet to claim that the Greeks still
rightfully owned the Parthenon, by defining the Greeks ethnically, poses
a whole host of problems. Without getting into the complex question of
Greek ethnicity, it is clear that ethnicity in general is a vague concept at
best. One might then turn to a theory of ownership by acquisition, that
the Ottoman Empire acquired the Parthenon through conquest and that
it rightfully became its property. Yet the culture behind the monument
was one completely alien to them. If cultural expression is the basis of
finding value in a monument (as it surely is-rocks are immortal, yet they
do not evoke an emotional response), then it seems necessary to take
account of the culture whose heritage the monument represents.
These questions have resulted in two conflicting approaches to
cultural property known as cultural nationalism and cultural
internationalism. Cultural nationalism looks upon cultural property as
the cultural expression of a particular people or region, and therefore
concludes that physical property related to a specific culture should
belong exclusively to the inheritors of that culture. To destroy a cultural
2Id.
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monument is to attack the identity of the people whose culture it
represents, and thus the country which represents those people should
have property rights over such monuments.24 This view is particularly
important with regard to movable cultural property, and is well
exemplified by Greece's request for the return of the Elgin Marbles.' As
the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property states, "cultural property constitutes one of the basic
elements of civilization and national culture, and... its true value can be
appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information regarding
its origin, history and traditional setting. " In contrast, cultural
internationalism begins with the assertion that cultural property, while
certainly important to the country in which is it found, is more
importantly part of the cultural heritage of mankind as a wholeY At
least one writer has surmised that the Brussels Convention of 1874, an
early attempt at codifying the law of war which was never ratified, first
expressed the doctrine of cultural internationalism.' Yet both Grotius
and Vattel seemed to have had a similar approach in mind. Grotius notes
in passing that the destruction of sacred objects, though legal, shows
"some contempt for humanity."' Vattel is clearer on the point. He
makes an argument for sparing works of art which "do honour to human
society," and condemns their destruction as "declaring oneself an enemy
to mankind, thus wantonly to deprive them of these wonders of art.. ."'
24 Karen Detling, Eternal Silence: The Destruction of Cultural Propeny in Yugoslavia, 17
MD. J. INr'L L. & TRADE 41, 50 (1993).
21 See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 9. Lord Elgin took many of the statuaries of the
Partihenon to England while what is now Greece was still under Ottoman rule. The Greek
government has since lobbied vigorously for their return.
26 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and TransferofOwneship of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,823 U.N.T.S. 231,
232, 9 LL.M. 1038, 1040, pmbl. [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
27 Detling, supra note 24, at 5 1.
28 WLLiAMS, supra note 3, at 17.
29 HuGo GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 364 (Louise R Loomis ed., Walter J.
Black 1949) (1625).
30 EMERIC DE VATEL, THE LAW OF NATIONs 367 (Chitty ed., 1844).
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Presumably "them" refers to mankind, thus implying that we are all
adversely affected by the destruction of art, regardless of its national or
cultural origin. He goes on to give the example of the barbarians who
sacked Rome in 410 AD., noting that even today we detest them for
destroying such a monument to human creativity.
Unlike the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1954 Hague
Cultural Property Convention embodies a cultural internationalist
approach. The preamble to the 1954 Convention notes that "damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to
the cultural heritage of all mankind."31 Thus countries serve merely as
custodians of cultural property found within their borders, and they are
under a duty not only to preserve it but also to make it available to the
rest of the world.32 The 1972 World Heritage Convention, as is implied
by its title, also takes the intemationalist approach, focussing on
monuments of "exceptional interest" and "universal value."33 Even the
1970 UNESCO Convention reflects cultural internationalist ideas in that
it justifies itself on the pretext of the need to appreciate cultural property
in context, thus focussing on the consumption of such property by
outsiders.'
That these conventions take an internationalist approach does not
mean, however, that they adhere entirely to the cultural internationalist
perspective. The custodial ideal upon which cultural internationalism is
based is just that: an ideal. State sovereignty remains paramount, and
none of the discussed conventions sanction the interference in a state's
sovereignty. To return to the example of the Parthenon, the Greek
government might decide to tear it down to make room for parking, and
while other countries would certainly complain, there would be no legal
basis for another state to interfere.35 The construction of the Aswan High
Dam, with the subsequent destruction or displacement of many ancient
311954 Hague Convention, supra note 6, pmbl, 249 U.N.T.S. at 240.
32 WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 52.
3 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Dec.
17, 1975,27 U.S.T. 37, 11 IL.LM 1358.
1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 26,9 I.LM at 1038, Annex. 1I.
3 WLLAMS, supra note 3, at 54-55.
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Egyptian archaeological sites, offers a real life example of such a
situation. As Williams notes, "[t]he common cultural heritage must be
seen in terms of preservation and protection. This view, although
adhering to the idea of a state's position as custodian, does not in fact
challenge its property rights."' Thus cultural internationalism, though
the dominant theory behind the international protection of cultural
property, must be seen as a flexible approach to the problem which
requires adjustment and revision in light of differing situations. As an
examination of the systematic destruction of cultural property in
Bosnia-Herzegovina will demonstrate, the case of religious property
represents a situation in which the traditional cultural internationalist
approach to cultural property is inadequate and in great need of revision.
IV. THE DESTRUCnON OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTY IN BOsNIA-
HERZEGOVINA
A. The Scope of the Destruction of Religious Property in
Bosnia-Herzegovina
It is inevitable that in a situation of armed conflict, cultural
property will be damaged. Neither the technology nor the ideology of
warfare has evolved sufficiently to preclude the destruction of historic
and religious monuments. The scope of the destruction in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, exceeds what one would expect to find
were all or even most of the damage merely collateral to military
objectives. I shall discuss the reasons for this in Section C below, but it
is first necessary to examine the extent to which religious property has
been damaged.
Information about almost any aspect of the conflict in Bosnia is
limited, uneven, frequently inaccurate and often exploited for purposes of
propaganda. Thomas Warrick notes that one newspaper article gives the
following figures: about 1000 mosques, 483 Catholic churches and 470
" Id. at 55.
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Serbian Orthodox churches damaged or destroyed.37 The Council of
Europe has sent an observer to Bosnia periodically to report on the state
of cultural property, and has generated reports which are for the most
part based upon eyewitness accounts by their consultant. This seems to
be the most reliable information available so far, but even in this case
reports are sometimes contradictory. Additionally, one must take into
account the fact that independent observers have not been allowed into
some areas, and have been prevented by wartime conditions from
inspecting others. The Council of Europe was allowed into the town of
Gradacac in northern Bosnia. It is useful to look at the effect of the war
on this area's cultural heritage in order to understand, without relying on
questionable statistics, the nature of the destruction which is taking place.
B. Gradacac - A Case Study
Before the war, the population of the Gradacac district was
56,378. The town itself contained 12,500 inhabitants, but has now been
reduced to about 7,000.38 Muslims comprised 60.2% of the district
population; the remaining population being 19.8% Serb, 15.1% Croat,
and 4.9% other (presumably mixed families).39 The town had been
bombarded since the beginning of the war by Bosnian Serb Army (BSA)
forces since it lies at a strategic position at the end of the Posavina
corridor, which links the previously Serb-held Krajina, Serb-held Bosnia,
and Serbia.'
According to the September 1993 report of the Institute for the
Protection of the Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of the
Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo), all four mosques "which
37 Thomas Warrick, Carnegie Foundation Symposium, (May 2, 1994), <
gopher.//cormier. Icomos. Org: 70/1 1/.icomosftreaties/hahueleamegie/bos5>.
38 Report on a Fact-Finding Mission on the Situation of the Cultural Hetitage in
Bosnia-Hezegovina andCroatia, 30May - 22 June, 1994, at 8, Eur. Parl. Ass. Rep. Doc.
AS/Cult/AA (June 27, 1994)[hereinafter Council ofEurope Report (June 1994)].
31 Stjepko Golubic et al., How Not to Divide the Indivisible, in Wiiy BOSNA 230 (Rabia
Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993).
40 Council ofEurope Report (June 1994), supra note 38, at 8.
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have the status of cultural monuments" had been destroyed."' The report
mentions only the Husenija Mosque (built 1827), but the June 1994
Council of Europe Report remarks only that it had been "hit twice in the
minaret (the cherefa is broken in one place), probably by tank cannon,"
and that a small library and building for ablutions had also been
damaged.42 Reuf-Bey Gradascevic Mosque (19th century) is also
reported to be damaged by two hits on the roof43 Svirac Mosque
suffered one shell impact on its porch, and Bukvara Mosque was hit in
the facade by a large projectile.'
The Council of Europe Report points to several mosques in
nearby villages on the eastern Gradacac front as clear examples of
deliberate targeting of mosques. In Mionica 1, a shell broke the minaret
of the local mosque above the cherefa, and another tank shell pierced the
outer and interior walls of the mosque.45 In Mlonica 2, another mosque
also sustained a broken minaret and tank impacts on its walls. The
mosque in Krcevina was severely damaged when its minaret was
destroyed and fell through the roof of the mosque.' This mosque also
suffered a number of hits on the facade and outer wall. Village mosques
on the southwest front of Gradacac have also suffered damage, in
particular the mosque at Zelinja Srednja which was hit on the root the
base of the minaret, and in the yard.47
The Catholic Church of St. Mark (1888) suffered damage by
grenades, and was looted (although the report does not make clear who
was responsible for this)." The Orthodox Church of St. Elijah (1882)
41 Information Document submitted by the Institute for the Protection of the
Cultral-HIstorical and Natural Heritage of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at 46,
included in Fourth Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, EuR. PARL. Doc. (ADOC 6999) (1994)[hereinafter Insitute
Report].
42 Council ofEurope Report (June 1994), supra note 38, at 8.
43 Id.






was hit by shells, seriously damaging its roof and steeple. This same
church was also vandalized, apparently in retaliation for shelling by the
BSA. Two fires were set in the church, frescoes were painted over,
icons were vandalized, and liturgical items were thrown about.'
This appears to be a fairly typical pattern of destruction of
religious property in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Much of the damage is
probably collateral damage from Serb shelling of the town. As both the
Institute report and the Council of Europe (June 1994) report point out,
the entire town of Gradacac has been severely damaged.' The historic
castle has been targeted extensively, and there is much damage to the
town center. The June 1994 report asserts that Gradacac is "undeniably
one of the worst damaged towns seen by the consultant in Bosnia."'"
Given this enormous level of general destruction, it seems reasonable to
assume that some of the damage to religious property was not the result
of deliberate targeting of mosques.
On the other hand, in certain cases it seems more than likely that
the mosques were purposefully targeted. Of the eight mosques reported
damaged in Gradacac, four minarets were hit and at least partly
destroyed, while a fifth was hit with no reported damage. The Council of
Europe Report (February 1993) notes that "it is highly doubtful that a
minaret can be brought down with a single large caliber shell, which
implies a certain amount of deliberate targeting on these structures. " 52 It
also takes very good aim, since a minaret is generally quite slender and
would occupy only a small percentage of the profile of a mosque. The
likelihood of hitting four out of eight minarets by purely random terror
shelling seems small.
The grenade damage to St. Mark's Church may or may not have
been deliberate, but looting is clearly deliberate. Yet, several questions
49 Id.
' Institute Report, supra note 41, at 41; and Council ofEurope Report (June 1994), supra
note 38, at 8.
5' Council ofEurope Report (June 1994), supra note 38, at 8.
5 WarDamage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia andBosnia-Herzegovina, app. C, at
42, in Infomation Report on the Deshncion by War of the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, EuR. PAmL. Ass., Doc. No. 6756 (Feb. 2,1993).
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remain. Who looted the church? Was it spontaneous or performed under
orders? Was the action aimed at Catholicism, or was the looting carried
out in search of money or valuable objects? Without more information,
it is impossible to answer these questions.
The looting of the Orthodox Church of St. Elijah seems a clear
case of reprisal by the local population. The looting was purely
destructive in nature, and focused upon religious symbols and items used
in Orthodox services. It is unclear, however, whether the action was
spontaneous or sanctioned by authority. Serbian authorities list the
church as destroyed. 3
C. "Ethnic Cleansing" and the Destruction of Cultural Property
A thorough examination of the phenomenon in the former
Yugoslavia that has come to be known as "ethnic cleansing" would be
beyond the scope of this paper. A general understanding of the meaning
of ethnicity in relation to religion, however, is important in order to place
in context the practice of targeting for destruction religious property in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yugoslavia was the most heterogeneous country
in Europe, including six "nations," (Serbs, Muslims, Croats,
Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Slovenes), ten different nationalities
(smaller ethnic groups, such as Albanians and Bulgarians), and a variety
of other ethnic groups.' These "nations" are not racially distinct, but
rather are distinguished by a number of cultural factors, among which
religion is predominant. For historical reasons that need not detain us
here, the Serbs are Orthodox Christians and the Croats are Roman
Catholic. The "Muslims," recognized as a "nation" since 1971, were the
indigenous Bosnians who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule.5
They were neither Croats nor Serbs historically, but a separate Slav
people who had embraced a Christian heresy known as Bogomilism until
53 SLOBODAN MILEUSNIC, SpImRIuAL GENOCIDE 101 (1994).
1 HUGH POutTON, THE BALKANs: MisoRmnEs AND STATES IN CoNw.Ficr 5 (Minority
Rights Group 1993).
" Id. at 39.
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converting to Islam.
None of these three groups constitutes a majority in Bosnia.
Muslims make up the largest group, comprising 43.6% of the population,
the rest being 19.4% Serb, 17.3% Croat, and 7.8% other.' While Serbs
can look to Serbia as an ethnic homeland, and Croats can look to
Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims have no external source of ethnic
identification. Declared a constituent national group in 1971, Bosnian
Muslims cannot consider themselves the overflow of some other national
group into Bosnia. They are a separate group by virtue of religion, not
national origin. Since the other two ethnic groups have distinct religious
affiliations of their own, religion in Bosnia has come to be inseparable
from ethnic and cultural identity.
Targeting cultural property, which the Council of Europe has
referred to as "cultural cleansing," has played a significant role in the
general practice of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.5" The destruction of the
old Mostar Bridge and the National Library in Sarajevo has drawn
worldwide media attention as examples of deliberate destruction of
cultural property which was perceived as representing the heritage of an
opposing group. At times, the combatants have been extremely candid
about their policy of targeting cultural property. In 1992, for example,
BBCjoumalist Kate Adie asked a Serbian officer why Serb gunners had
been shelling the Holiday Inn, which housed most foreign journalists in
Sarajevo. The officer replied apologetically that they were not targeting
the hotel, but rather were aiming at the National Museum just behind the
hotel.59 Similarly, a soldier serving under Bosnian Croat militia leader
Mate Boban explained their reasons for targeting the Mostar Bridge,
which they eventually brought down in November 1993: "[i]t is not
enough to cleanse Mostar of the Muslims, the relics must also be
SFERDINAND SaEv. A HISTORY OF THE BALKANS FROM THE EARLIEST TIMEs TO THE
PRESENTrDAY 163-64 (1991).
" Statistics from the Official 1991 Yugoslav Population Census of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
reprinted in WHY BosNIA 216 (Rabia Ali &'Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993).
s Institute Report, supra note 41, at 16.
9 Andras Reidlmayer, Carnegie Foundation Symposium, (May 2,1994), <gopher:#
cormier.Icomos.Org:70/1 1/.icomostreaties/hagueeamegie/bos2>.
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destroyed."'  Armies are, in the words of one journalist, "erasing
Bosna's memory. '
"Cultural cleansing" was initiated by the BSA and, since the
failure of the Vance-Owen peace plan in the spring of 1993, Bosnian
government forces (Bill) and Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) have taken
up the practice as well.62 Localized reprisals have also become a
standard feature of cultural cleansing; the typical scenario being the
vandalism of a Serbian Orthodox church in response to shelling by BSA
forces. Serbian cultural cleansing is often accomplished by shelling,
although a great deal of mining is reported to have occurred in areas
under Serb control. The HVO and Bill forces typically must resort to
mining and burning, however, due to their relative lack of artillery.
Damage by such means tends to be more thorough than that
accomplished by shelling.'
Religious property has been particularly affected for a number of
reasons. First, religious property must inevitably suffer from any
generalized attack on cultural property, as religion is generally an integral
part of culture. Second, religion in the former Yugoslavia tends to be
determined along ethnic lines. The Serbian Orthodox Church is a major
component of the cultural heritage and identity of Serbs, just as the
Catholic Church is integrally a part of Croatian culture and Islam a part
of Bosnian Muslim culture. Religion is the first and easiest identifier of
these different cultures, and religious monuments hence are the most
easily identifiable targets of ethnic attacks and reprisals. Churches and
mosques are large, central, unmistakable targets, and their very visibility
and presence render them not only easy targets, but extremely desirable
ones as well. A minaret is a constant reminder of the presence of
Muslims, hence a natural target for those with a hatred of this religious
group. As Andras Riedelmeyer explained during a symposium hosted by
the Carnegie Foundation, "a people's identity is inextricably linked with
the visible symbols of its culture. Once those anchors are gone, the past,
6 Id.
62 Erasing Bosnia's Memory, WAS- PosT, Oct. 16, 1992, at A24 (editorial).
62 Institute Report, supra note 41, at 16.
6 Id.
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like the future, can be recreated by the victors."" Destroying the highly
visible elements of culture has an ideological aspect as well: "The very
fact of these monuments existing in close proximity is an affront to the
historical myth that underlies fascist ideology. The ideology proclaims
that people, in fact, cannot live together. If you have these presences
next to each other, it is a daily reproach to that ideology. "65
Finally, churches and mosques are extremely intimate and thus
effective targets. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic has accused the
Serb forces of seeking "the destruction of religion as a basis of the
identity and as spiritual support for the Bosnian people. 5 Since the war
began, religious institutions have played a central role in the lives of many
as both sources of spiritual comfort and companionship and as charitable
institutions.' Targeting such sources of comfort to the local population
is a logical extension of the terror bombing strategy which has been
employed mainly by Bosnian Serbs throughout the war. Moreover, it is
a logical extension of the policy of ethnic cleansing. Since ethnicity in
Bosnia is directly linked with religion, ethnic cleansing is necessarily
related to religious cleansing or, as Slobodan Mileusnic has called it,
"spiritual genocide."' By destroying the religious heritage of a specific
group in a region, one not only severs their historical link to the region,
but one makes religious life in that region next to impossible.
That religious practice itself is being targeted in Bosnia is
evidenced by a number of practices which are reported to be occurring.
Shelling churches and mosques may or may not target the religion per se,
as there is always the possibility that the building has only received
collateral damage. Moreover, it is likely that many religious buildings are
targeted simply due to their visual presence as a symbol of "the enemy."
Vandalism, however, seems more clearly aimed at inhibiting religious
' Riedlmayer, supra note 59.
65 Id.
' Roger Cohen, Bosnia Debate: Army as Defender ofIslam orMulticulturalism?, N.Y.
TirEs, Feb. 4, 1995, at 4.
6 Paul Wilkes, MostarMan: "LetMy Son Be the Last Sacrifice:" War Brings Bosnians
Back to Churches "Like an Apocalypse, 'NAT'L CAR. REP., Jan. 29, 1993, at 7.
6 Id.
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worship, as destroying the inside of a building can be neither accidental
nor intended to eliminate the visual provocation of the building itself.
The vandalism of the Church of St. Elijah in Gradacac offers a good
example. Inside the church, thus out of view of all except the practicing
Orthodox community, vandals painted over frescoes, damaged icons, and
scattered liturgical items around the church. None of these actions
entirely prevents worship, but the acts of desecration seem to be an
attempt to disrupt the religious life of those who must worship in the
desecrated building. In particular, the destruction of icons, which play an
important sacred role in Orthodox worship, seems intended as a
deliberate affront specifically to the religious faith of the Serbs.
A similar tactic has been employed on a wide scale by BSA
forces, which the Council of Europe report termed "befouling."69 This
is the deliberate desecration of a religious monument, often by putting the
building to uses inconsistent with its purpose. Serbs have been accused
of using mosques as slaughterhouses, prisons, and morgues.7" One
eyewitness reported being held with another 150-180 men in a mosque
for four days and being forced to relieve himself in the sacred ablution
basin.7' Such actions are often accompanied by or include intimidation of
clergy. An eyewitness reported that he and about 150 others were forced
into a mosque where the local Imam was ordered to desecrate the
mosque by making the sign ofthe cross, eating pork, and having sex with
a teenage gid 2 Such attacks are so focused upon the religious beliefs of
their victims that it is difficult not to conclude that they are intended as
attacks against a specific people's ability to practice religion.
V. CULTURAL INTERNATONALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS
PROPERTY
A. The Right to Freedom of Worship
Institute Report, supra note 4 1, at 17.




While much of the human rights law concerning freedom of
religion has focused upon prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
religion, there is nevertheless a wide range of provisions which
specifically address religious practice. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights asserts a person's freedom "either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance."' The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which differs from the Universal
Declaration in that it is a binding convention, uses almost identical
language in its Article 18.' This language has important implications for
the destruction of religious property. The right to manifest religion "in
community with others" would seem to be severely limited, if not entirely
prevented, by an active policy of destroying buildings suitable to this
purpose. Moreover, religious "practice, worship, and observance"
cannot be filly enjoyed without certain articles of religious property. The
importance of icons in the Orthodox faith and of Communion in the
Catholic faith illustrate this point, although it is interesting to note that
Islam depends less upon sacred places and articles of worship than do
these Christian sects.' Finally, Article 27 of the Covenant requires that
states with religious minorities must ensure their right "in community
with other members of the group" to practice their religion.76
Although it is not a binding instrument, the United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief contains much more explicit
language bearing upon the need to protect religious property. Article
VI(a) includes a right to worship and assemble, as well as "to establish
SG.A. Res. 217 A (M), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, art. 18(1948).
7' GA Res. 2200 A (XX), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
at 52, art. 18, (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 374 (1967),
[hereinafter ICCPR].
7- Martin Frishman, Islam and the Form of the Mosque, in THE MOSQUE: HISTORY,
ARCHmfEC'jRAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL DrvERsrrY 17, 32 (Martin Frishman &
Hasan-Uddin Khan eds.,1994).
76 ICCPR, supra note 74, art 27.
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and maintain places for these purposes." It is arguable that the right to
"maintain" such places must include the right not to have such places
destroyed. Article VI(C) is intended to cover the contents of religious
buildings, asserting the right "to make, to acquire and to use to an
adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or
customs to a religion or belief."' Finally, the Declaration provides for a
right to teach religion "in places suitable for these purposes," which refers
to and bolsters the right to maintain such places and not to have them
destroyed.79
Human rights law, however, even when binding, is to a certain
extent derogable during periods of public emergency, including armed
conflict." Article 4(2) of the ICCPR includes a list of rights which are
non-derogable even during armed conflict, and this includes the Article
18 right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Furthermore,
Article 4(1) stipulates that a derogation must not involve discrimination
based solely on religion. Human rights can also be limited by "limitation
clauses," which permit permanent limitations on human rights which are
necessary to protect national security, public safety, health, order, and
morals." While freedom of thought, conscience, and religion does not
fall into this category of limitable rights, the right to manifest religion can
be limited so as not to interfere with the human rights of others.' It
could hardly be argued, however, that the destruction of churches and
mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina was necessary for the protection of
national security or the human rights of others.
Humanitarian law serves an important role in the protection of
" United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion orBelief, art VI (a), G.A Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A136151 (1981).
78 Id., at art VI (e).
79 Id., at art VI (e).
go See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 74, art 4.
"I RoBmErTB. lauLH, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RImrS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, PoLIcY, AND
PRAcncE 857 (1991).
2 Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN
Declaration on the Elimination ofReligious Intolerance andDiscrimination, 82 AM. J.
OF INr'L L. 487,493 (1988).
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human rights during armed conflict. Even were the ICCPR rights of
freedom of worship derogable in the context of the war in Bosnia, the
provisions of the Geneva Convention and the 1977 Protocols address to
a great extent the religious rights which the destruction of religious
property would violate. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
provides in Article 27 that "protected persons are entitled, in all
circumstances, to respect for.. . their religious convictions and practices,
and their manners and customs."' Moreover, Article 58 of the same
Convention requires that the "Occupying Power shall permit ministers of
religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of their religious
communities," and that they "accept consignments of books and articles
required for religious needs and shall facilitate their distribution in
occupied territory. "" Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions addresses
the right of worship of those in the power of a party to the conflict who
do not qualify for special treatment under another section of the Geneva
Conventions or the Protocol. Paragraph 1 of Article 75, requires that as
a minimum requirement all persons be accorded respect for their
convictions and religious practices. The word "practices" is again
important, as it specifically addresses the act of worship rather than
referring to passive belief. It would be difficult to argue that the
destruction of churches and mosques outside the zone of combat would
be allowed under this provision. To the extent that the conflict in Bosnia
may be considered a non-international conflict, identical language in
Article 4 of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions would apply.
Article 53 of Protocol I and the identical language in Article 16
of Protocol I, protecting cultural objects and places of worship, were
until recently the only instances in which the right to worship and the
prohibition on targeting cultural property were linked as closely related
phenomena. As noted in Part II above, Article 53 forbids "acts of
hostility directed against historic monuments, works of art or places of
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples..
' Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug,
12, 1949, art. 27,6 U.S.T. 3516,3536,75 U.N.T.S. 287,306.
84 d., at art 58.
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,,15 Assuming that "historic' is meant to modify only the word
"monuments," it follows that artworks and places of worship which are
part of the spiritual heritage of peoples are protected regardless of their
cultural or historical value." This proved to be a divisive issue in the
drafting of the Protocols, as did initially the inclusion of the articles at
17all.
Some delegations argued that to include all places of worship
regardless of cultural value would deprive culturally significant property
of its special status, especially since local religious buildings are so often
used for military purposes.8 The draft article referred specifically to
places of worship, but only to cultural and not spiritual heritage. As
there was still disagreement as to whether any place of worship was part
of the cultural heritage of peoples, the committee deleted reference to
places of worship from Article 53 and placed it in Article 3 as an example
of property normally committed to civilian use. Local churches would
therefore receive the normal protection of other civilian property, and an
understanding was reached that culturally important places of worship
would not be deprived protection under the language covering cultural
monuments and buildings. At the insistence of a large number of states,
however, "places of worship" was returned and supplemented with the
current language on "cultural or spiritual heritage."" It has been argued,
however, that this language goes no farther than the compromise
arrangement, and thus that local churches receive no more protection
than other civilian property.' The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) took this view, noting that "spiritual heritage of peoples"
was meant only to cover objects "whose value transcends geographical
boundaries, and which are unique in character and are intimately
Protocoll, supra note 11, art. 16.
s Toman, supra note 14, at 564-65.
'"MaiABOTmE ErAL,NEwRuLEs FOR Vicrm OF ARMED CONFLICrs: COMMENTARY
ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITONAL TO THE GENEVA CoNvEImoNs OF 1949, at
331 (1982).
SId.
Id. at 332. In particular, a number of Muslim states, along with the Holy See and Italy,
insisted on this modification. Id.
90 Id.
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associated with the history and culture of a people."9 The ICRC noted
that spiritual importance may exist even in the absence of cultural
importance, and that "spiritual" was written into the Protocol to cover
such situations, but not to extend protection to local churches or
mosques 2
The Belgian delegate described this view well, saying
that the article referred to 'places of worship so
intimately associated with those faiths that, more than all
the other religious buildings already protected under
Article 47 [Article 52 of the final version of Protocol 1],
they seemed to be their true embodiment on earth.'"
The Saudi Arabian delegate, however, seemed to feel
that the phrase 'or spiritual' extended special protection
to all places of worship, presumably under the theory
that any place of worship must be part of the spiritual
heritage of that particular faith.94
B. A New Approach to Religious Property
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has dramatically
demonstrated the vulnerability of religious property in wartime.
Moreover, it has offered an ideal case study demonstrating the value of
the spiritual heritage provision of the 1977 Protocols, and supporting the
position of those delegations who wished to extend protection to all
religious property. Hopefully, if the world community heeds the lessons
of this conflict, it will stimulate further reevaluation of how we think
about the protection of cultural property during armed conflict.
Cultural property, whether religious in nature or not, derives its
91 INIERNATIONAL COMMriTEE OF THE RED CRoss, COMMENrARY ON THE ADDmONAL
PROTOcOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AuGusT 1949, at 646
(1987).
92Id. at 1469.
91 HowARD S. LEviE, 3 PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949
GENEVA CoNvEN'noNs 221 (1980).
9 Id. at 217.
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need for protection from a certain bundle of rights implicated in its
continued existence. The cultural internationalists are correct when they
suggest that all of humankind has an interest in the continued existence of
the Mostar Bridge, in preserving that "attempt to grasp eternity." Such
works of art help give meaning to humanity, and it seems appropriate to
refer to our collective interest in creating meaning through art as a right.
Similarly, the cultural nationalists are also correct in observing that the
Mostar Bridge may be a stronger vehicle for giving meaning to the lives
of Bosnians than to the rest of us. Their interests in the Bridge's survival
may be stronger than ours, since it is in some sense their bridge. It is not
only a monument to humanity, but also a part of the history of a
particular people, and therefore maintains additional importance to that
people. The war in Bosnia has demonstrated that this very importance
renders such property valuable as a military target to those who wish to
drive people from their homes. The attack on the Mostar Bridge was an
affiont to humankind, but it was also an assault on the culture which built
it. It was a spiritual attack on a people, and a deliberate attempt to drive
them off by annihilating that which helps give meaning to their fives.
Cultural and religious property, then, deserves special protection
not only because its destruction hurts humankind as a whole, but
additionally because such destruction constitutes an attack on the objects
through which a people defines itself. Cultural property law, is in this
way a statement to the effect that attacks directed at the human spirit will
not be tolerated. In this light, one can see that a strict adherence to the
cultural internationalist approach is clearly inadequate with respect to
both religious and secular cultural property. By focusing on the heritage
of all mankind, it becomes too easy to disregard the needs of the
communities which the property in question was originally designed to
serve. The Arc de Triomphe was obviously not built as a service to the
surrounding neighborhoods of Paris. The Husenija Mosque in Gradacac,
however, was built with a specific place and community in mind. While
the architects certainly attempted to make the mosque beautiful, and
while the residents of the town may feel a certain pride in showing the
mosque to outsiders, its value to the cultural heritage of mankind is
minimal at best. It is simply one of hundreds of similar mosques
scattered throughout the Balkans. Even to the Islamic world, such a
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mosque is unimportant from the point of view of international cultural or
spiritual heritage. At least two books devoted to mosque architecture of
the world have deemed Yugoslavian mosques unworthy of more than a
passing mention.' Their importance is to their communities, and the
international community should more thoroughly consider its duty to
those communities to ensure the protection of locally important religious
property.
Moreover, the approach to cultural property as property has
proven insufficient to deal with cases of globally insignificant but locally
important religious property. Cultural property is seen for theoretical
purposes as the common property of the world. We feel that we, as
human beings, have some right implicated in the continued existence of
the Pyramids or St. Peter's. Such property derives its value to the world
through its cultural importance. The importance of religious property,
however, cannot be so easily explained, although ultimately similar
interests are implicated. While the Husenija Mosque may not be of any
importance to non-Muslim Americans, either as a peerless cultural work
or as a spiritual monument, its role in the Gradacac Muslim community's
continuing right to worship is of the utmost significance. As a
fundamental human right, the right of religious freedom applies to all
humanity, and its denial to any people is a legitimate subject for
international concern.
As can be seen from the relevant provisions discussed above, the
right to continue the practices which constitute the physical manifestation
of religious belief is a crucial part of the right of religious freedom. While
the law relating to the protection of cultural property during time of
armed conflict focuses on the property itseW what is really at stake in the
situation of religious property is the functional aspect of the property in
question. Its value is derived from the role it plays in the life of the local
community it serves and the activities to which its continued existence is
essential. A church or mosque is more than physical property. It is part
of a process through which men and women express their religious belief
' See THE MOSQUE: HISTORY, ARCHrfEcrURAL DEVELOPMENT AND RGIONAL
DIVEIsruY (~atinFrishiman &Hansan-Uddin Khan eds., 1994). See also JOHN D. HOAG,
ILsA1c ARarEcrm (1977).
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Thus, the systematic destruction of religious property which has occurred
in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be seen as more than the destruction of
property. It is the systematic denial of the right of religious freedom
through the destruction of the physical necessities of worship and the
physical representations of faith so important to a community sense of
identity.
In this way, the need to protect even local religious property goes
hand in hand with the need to protect cultural property generally. The
world community is affected in the sense that such destruction
constitutes a human rights violation, and plays an important role in the
process of ethnic cleansing which we all have an interest in preventing.
Moreover, on the local level, the destruction of religious property plays
the same role as the destruction of cultural property generally. Whether
or not the Husenija Mosque is of cultural importance, its destruction
constitutes a deliberate attack on the spirituality of a people in an attempt
to take meaning from their lives and drive them from their homes. It is
an attack on spirituality itself, just as was the destruction of the Mostar
Bridge. Why, then, exclude religious property from the special
protection offered cultural property simply because it is not of "cultural"
value? Such property shares with cultural property the most salient
attributes which make it particularly vulnerable, and its destruction
particularly painful. Whether a people attempt to bring spiritual meaning
to their lives through art or through religion, their right to do so needs
international protection. Otherwise, cultural and religious property offers
too tempting a target for anyone undertaking a campaign of ethnic
cleansing. This is the case regardless of the abstract questions of
ownership posited by the false opposition of cultural nationalism and
cultural internationalism.
Cultural property law has advanced well beyond the general
protections offered civilian property by the Hague Conventions of 1907.
It has recognized that certain objects deserve extra protection because of
their importance to the cultural heritage of mankind. In the Protocols of
the Geneva Conventions, we see the international community fumbling
toward the next step in such protection-the recognition that places of
worship need similar special protections for similar reasons. The
reference to the "spiritual heritage" of peoples in the Protocols is an
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important step towards the realization that special protection of certain
property is merited not for reasons relating to property, but rather
because implicated in the continued existence of certain objects is
humanity's quest for beauty and meaning. By addressing these rights, it
seems clear that any place of worship is necessarily part of the spiritual
heritage ofpeoples, and that the restrictive view of this phrase as adopted
by many nations is profoundly wrong-headed. Religious property and
culturl property serve similar purposes. They are both manifestations of
humanity's right to attempt to grasp eternity. Once we heed the lessons
of Bosnia and begin to focus on this right, rather than on the theoretical
property interests of the international community, the legal protection of
both cultural and religious property during armed conflict will attain a
logical consistency which heretofore it has lacked.
